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Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures (PFMI)

Bank for International Settlements — Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI) (BIS-CPMI)

Last updated 7 Jun 2026 · Full ledger: Hallucination Register · Parent: BIS-CPMI

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Findings live
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AI subjects
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Citation issues
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Dominant mode count
Research Complete Hallucination findings published
Hallucination Shape
(3 Response Hallucination + 6 Citation Hallucination = 9 Hallucination findings)

Citation Hallucination Modes (6 failures)

Fabricated 0
Pretextual 0
Contradictory 6
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Hallucination findings

3 finding cards across 2 AI Models — covering 3 Response Hallucinations + 6 Citation Hallucinations (9 hallucination failures total). Each card pairs the AI's answer against the authenticated regulator-text excerpt that contradicts it, and flags every AI-cited source as Fabricated / Pretextual / Contradictory.

Model: Claude Opus 4.7 (web search on) · published 2026-06-07 · Inference Drift
RLB-H-INT-BIS-CPMI-IOSCO-PFMI-2012-Q022-Opus47
PFMI Principle 2, Key Consideration 6 requires FMI boards to establish a documented risk-management framework covering risk-tolerance policy and crisis decision-making — it does not explicitly mandate a risk committee chaired by a non-executive member, contrary to the AI's assertion. The AI also inverted the order of the first two Key Considerations and misattributed KC 5's management-roles content to internal-control requirements.
Claude Opus 4.7 (web search on) answered
KC 2.6 contemplates that the board establish a risk committee that is chaired by a suitably qualified, non-executive member
Regulator text says
KC 6: The board should establish a clear, documented risk-management framework...Governance arrangements should ensure that the risk-management and internal control functions have sufficient authority, independence, resources, and access to the board.
Verbatim source
R2-REGULATION-d101a_PFMI_main_text.pdf — PFMI Principle 2 (Governance) — board composition and risk committee requirements
substrate/INT/BIS-CPMI/CPMI-IOSCO-PFMI-2012/_raw_manual_substrate/R2-REGULATION-d101a_PFMI_main_text.pdf
AI's cited sources
Model: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (web search on) · published 2026-06-07 · Inference Drift
RLB-H-INT-BIS-CPMI-IOSCO-PFMI-2012-Q011-Sonnet46
What oversight expectations does the PFMI's Annex F establish for critical service providers, and can regulators direct those expectations at critical service providers independently of the FMI?
Claude Sonnet 4.6 (web search on) answered
under the PFMI framework, authorities do not directly supervise or oversee CSPs. The responsibility for ensuring CSP compliance with Annex F expectations rests with the FMI itself; the FMI is expected to contractually require and monitor its CSPs' adherence. Annex F is framed as expectations that flow from the FMI to its CSPs
Regulator text says
A regulator, supervisor, or overseer of an FMI may want to establish expectations for an FMI's critical service providers in order to support the FMI's overall safety and efficiency. The expectations outlined below are specifically targeted at critical service providers.
Verbatim source
R2-REGULATION-d101a_PFMI_main_text.pdf — d123 — Critical service provider oversight expectations (Annex F)
substrate/INT/BIS-CPMI/CPMI-IOSCO-PFMI-2012/_raw_manual_substrate/R2-REGULATION-d101a_PFMI_main_text.pdf
Model: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (web search on) · published 2026-06-07 · Inference Drift
RLB-H-INT-BIS-CPMI-IOSCO-PFMI-2012-Q022-Sonnet46
Does PFMI Principle 2 require or recommend that FMI boards establish a dedicated risk committee, and if so, which key consideration contains that requirement?
Claude Sonnet 4.6 (web search on) answered
the PFMI does not expressly mandate a dedicated risk committee as a hard requirement, but Key Consideration 2.5 states that the board should consider establishing a risk committee with a clear mandate
Regulator text says
5. The roles and responsibilities of management should be clearly specified. An FMI's management should have the appropriate experience, a mix of skills, and the integrity necessary to discharge their responsibilities for the operation and risk management of the FMI.
Verbatim source
R2-REGULATION-d101a_PFMI_main_text.pdf — PFMI Principle 2 (Governance) — board composition and risk committee requirements
substrate/INT/BIS-CPMI/CPMI-IOSCO-PFMI-2012/_raw_manual_substrate/R2-REGULATION-d101a_PFMI_main_text.pdf

Affected audiences

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Company Secretaries
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Sectors × Departments

Investment Banking × Compliance
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Investment Banking × Governance_Cosec
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Investment Banking × Legal
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Investment Banking × Operations
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Payment Institutions × Compliance
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Payment Institutions × Governance_Cosec
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Payment Institutions × Legal
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← All regulations for BIS-CPMI

Every finding on this page compares an AI subject's account of the rule against the regulator's verbatim text from the regulator's own portal. Both are linked. Each delta, its root causes, and impact analysis are documented and published with immutable Citation IDs.