What does Section IV.3 of the 2025 OECD Merger Review Recommendation establish as the hierarchy for acceptable remedies in merger proceedings, and what is the priority ordering within the structural remedies tier?
Section IV.3 establishes a two-level preference: structural over behavioural, and standalone-business divestiture as the preferred structural form. The model elaborated this into a three-tier internal ranking, upfront/fix-it-first divestiture, buyer pool with trustee backstop, crown jewel packages, that maps onto common EU and US merger remedy practice but does not appear in the 2025 OECD Recommendation's text. The model substituted a practitioner-familiar remedy taxonomy drawn from other jurisdictions' frameworks for the Recommendation's simpler, less-prescriptive hierarchy, and presented the elaborated ranking as the OECD standard.
The three-tier internal remedy ranking the model produced maps precisely onto EU Merger Regulation remedy practice and US DOJ/FTC remedy convention — frameworks heavily represented in training. The OECD Recommendation's simpler two-level preference appears insufficiently weighted to override the more detailed framework when both are plausibly relevant. This implicates retrieval ranking (primary text vs. adjacent-jurisdiction commentary) and calibration (schema-elaboration confidence when the retrieved content does not support the elaboration).
When asked about the Section IV.3 remedy hierarchy, an AI tool substituted the EU merger-control practice framework, fix-it-first divestitures ranking highest, then upfront-buyer-with-trustee mandate, then crown jewel packages, as if it were the operative text of the OECD Recommendation. The Recommendation's actual internal priority within structural remedies is the standalone-business preference; it contains no timing-based three-sub-tier hierarchy.
A PE or VC Legal team using this AI output to set expectations with portfolio company management and advisers about what OECD adherent-state competition authorities are likely to require would be working from the wrong framework, creating both negotiation risk (misaligned concession positions) and timeline risk (surprise authority pushback on proposed remedy structures).
Each finding has a stable Citation ID (RLB-F-… for aggregated case-study findings, RLB-H-… for raw per-model hallucinations) — like a DOI, the ID always resolves to the canonical finding even if URLs change.
RegLeg Specialist Panel (2026). "Finding#2, EU remedy hierarchy misattributed as OECD Section IV.3 standard — Private Equity Vc × Legal — International / Multilateral." Citation ID: RLB-F-INT-OECD-OECD-MERGER-REVIEW-RECOMMENDATION-2025-Q002. RegLegBrief AI Hallucination Research, published 2026-06-11. https://reglegbrief.com/regulators/j1/int/OECD/OECD-MERGER-REVIEW-RECOMMENDATION-2025/sectors/private_equity_vc/legal/finding/INT-OECD-INT-001-OECD-MERGER-REVIEW-RECOMMENDATION-2025-v1-002/
RegLeg Specialist Panel. (2026). Finding#2, EU remedy hierarchy misattributed as OECD Section IV.3 standard [Hallucination finding RLB-F-INT-OECD-OECD-MERGER-REVIEW-RECOMMENDATION-2025-Q002]. RegLegBrief AI Hallucination Research. https://reglegbrief.com/regulators/j1/int/OECD/OECD-MERGER-REVIEW-RECOMMENDATION-2025/sectors/private_equity_vc/legal/finding/INT-OECD-INT-001-OECD-MERGER-REVIEW-RECOMMENDATION-2025-v1-002/
RegLeg Specialist Panel, Finding#2, EU remedy hierarchy misattributed as OECD Section IV.3 standard [RLB-F-INT-OECD-OECD-MERGER-REVIEW-RECOMMENDATION-2025-Q002], RegLegBrief AI Hallucination Research (June 11, 2026), https://reglegbrief.com/regulators/j1/int/OECD/OECD-MERGER-REVIEW-RECOMMENDATION-2025/sectors/private_equity_vc/legal/finding/INT-OECD-INT-001-OECD-MERGER-REVIEW-RECOMMENDATION-2025-v1-002/.
@misc{reglegbrief_RLB_F_INT_OECD_OECD_MERGER_REVIEW_RECOMMENDATION_2025_Q002,
author = {RegLeg Specialist Panel},
title = {Finding#2, EU remedy hierarchy misattributed as OECD Section IV.3 standard},
year = {2026},
publisher = {RegLegBrief AI Hallucination Research},
note = {Hallucination finding Citation ID: RLB-F-INT-OECD-OECD-MERGER-REVIEW-RECOMMENDATION-2025-Q002},
url = {https://reglegbrief.com/regulators/j1/int/OECD/OECD-MERGER-REVIEW-RECOMMENDATION-2025/sectors/private_equity_vc/legal/finding/INT-OECD-INT-001-OECD-MERGER-REVIEW-RECOMMENDATION-2025-v1-002/}
}
Every finding on this page compares an AI subject's account of the rule against the regulator's verbatim text from the regulator's own portal. Both are linked. Each delta, its root causes, and impact analysis are documented and published with immutable Citation IDs.